Here are some basic suggestions on how the following points may be addressed. As an eventual DAO there will be expected to be more input from a diverse body of individuals, and trying to address varying concerns and motives will be central to be able to keep the DAO governance process running.
Having said that, my personal opinion is that projects should be governance minimized to reduce overhead, voter apathy and ensure continuity and smooth flow of operations.
They can be raised like other types of paper proposals with a defined scope, period of discussion and ratification mechanism, such as Snapshot or the Frabric’s bespoke governance platform.
As there is no hard code to cap token minting at this point this presents a risk for a governance attack. I suggest to keep incentives and objectives aligned between key token holders so that they are able to understand and be informed the pros/cons of additional token minting and the reasons behind it.
I suppose this should be answered by someone with legal expertise but directionally the usage should be something which does not undermine the health and the economics of the platform as well as not committing anything illegal. Punishable offences would be a temp or permanent blacklisting of the ID to use the platform, depending on the severity of the offence.
This depends on the type of proposal. If its acquisition of property then a prospectus and legal framework/entity should be provided, as well as particulars of the Governor supporting it.
My understanding is that functionality Upgrades should ideally be limited to be proposed only by the developers of this project due to their deep knowledge, and those who are developing an integration to the Frabric platform. These Upgrade proposals would identify what is being upgraded and why, with a simple on-chain vote to be compliant to the governance process. I find that some mundane Upgrades being brought through the entire governance process will cause governance bloat and may paralyze the project if users are mal-informed and vote to object a potential upgrade.
We cannot anticipate all types of events, so hard to plan here.
Having said that, I suggest that we implement a model of governance with a reasonable timeframe before anything can be executed and ratified to allow for adequate discussions or investigations into the merits and mechanics of a proposal, with a veto mechanism (or emergency governance safeguards) so that attack vectors can be mitigated.
Obviously, having a strong team dedicated to Policy would also be extremely helpful, so don’t forget the humans participating in this project!